The Decade Horribilis. Organized Violence and Organized Crime along the Balkan Peripheries: 1991-2001 by STRAZZARI, Francesco
This article was downloaded by: [EUI European University Institute]
On: 26 April 2012, At: 02:10
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Mediterranean Politics
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmed20
The Decade Horribilis: Organized Violence and
Organized Crime along the Balkan Peripheries,
1991–2001
Francesco Strazzari a
a University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Available online: 26 Sep 2007
To cite this article: Francesco Strazzari (2007): The Decade Horribilis: Organized Violence and Organized Crime along the
Balkan Peripheries, 1991–2001, Mediterranean Politics, 12:2, 185-209
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629390701388661
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to
anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should
be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims,
proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in
connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
The Decade Horribilis: Organized
Violence and Organized Crime along
the Balkan Peripheries, 1991–2001
FRANCESCO STRAZZARI
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT The 10-year-long cycle of war that swept the Balkan peripheries saw the
soldering of nationalist agendas, local clientelistic interests, and transnational illicit
activities. This investigation seeks to shed light on the nexus that exists between this collusive
admixture and the process of violent geopolitical rearticulation. Using mainly investigative
journalism and specialized research, the author explores underground political economies,
mapping out illicit flows, reading the modifications in routes and distribution modalities in
connection with power shifts and war. The analysis moves from the Croatian secession to
the explosion of the ‘Albanian question’, from the underpinnings of Milosˇevic´’s regime to the
independence of Montenegro. The author identifies distinctive regularities that underlie the
symbiotic relationship between political power and organized crime structures: a possible
discontinuity is discerned in the longue dure´e trajectory of state making, war making and
illicit trades. While the political holds primacy, the global neo-liberal economy de-structures
traditional organizational models, empowers intermediation, and gives organized crime a
formidable opportunity to emancipate itself from the traditional role of provider, often
allowing direct intervention in the management of political violence and in the moulding of
state structures.
War Lights and Criminal Shadows
The decade horribilis that marked the end of the twentieth century saw the return of
war in Europe. The gloomy Balkan battlefields stood in dark contrast with the
exhilaration that many felt as the cold war structures collapsed, and a new world
order based on indivisibility of peace was proclaimed. A heterodox creature between
East and West, the Yugoslav federation imploded in a violent, ten-year-long agony,
during which nationalist projects collided with each other. Through the fog of war,
deep elements of elite collusion soon became discernible. Many of the fortunes of
the protagonists of this story had not to do with the epic of patriotic defence of the
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fatherland, but with obscure politico-military deals, black market transactions, and
mafia investments.
The ‘dark side’ of this war cannot, as one might be tempted to conclude too
hastily, be dismissed as the inevitable side effect of all wars. The following analysis
is an attempt to delve into these opaque processes, shedding some light on facts,
events, and connections that often have been relegated away from the main picture,
or used for hasty, caricatural representations.
The intertwining of newly emerged, ethnically defined institutions, mafia-style
war economies and elite connivance patterns is quite tangible. Seen from the ground,
war in Bosnia can be hardly reconciled sic et sempliciterwith the long dominant idea
of a ‘Greater Serb’, genocidal aggression that was resisted (at least from 1994
onward) by a Muslim–Croatian alliance receiving belated external support. A
scrutiny of local dynamics reveals the existence of a collection of local wars along
which state-dismantling and state-making projects have been articulated. Thus,
around the project of creating the Croatian state of Herzeg-Bosna, the very same
elites that were conducting terror campaigns in the daylight were making deals at
night. Most top-down diplomatic representations do not fully capture the nature of
war making and state making in Bosnia and, inasmuch as Bosnian events illuminate
wider regional dynamics, of the other wars in the region (Bjelakovic´ and Strazzari,
1998).
Accounting for eclipsed processes at a wide, regional level is not an easy task,
given the difficulty in collecting and verifying data. Nonetheless, there exist many
journalistic and academic sources tackling the nexus between political and criminal
agendas in the Balkans. While we still do not know much, our knowledge about how
events occurred is certainly beyond a first exploratory phase, and a theoretically
informed interpretation of empirical patterns can therefore be attempted.
A proviso is in order. This analysis of the dynamics of underground and criminal
economies is not intended to formulate truth claims on the ‘real causes’ of a war that
was prepared in the shadows. The question of root and proximate causes of peace
and war in the Balkans is too complex to be reduced to monocausal explanations.
The following analysis, for example, is not premised on economic greed as the key
causal mechanism behind armed conflict in the Yugoslav wars. Research on civil
war centred on the ‘greed versus grievance’ dichotomy (Collier and Sambanis,
2005) seems to be unable to properly account for deeper structural factors that shape
the forms that politics takes along world peripheries.
Now You Are On Your Own: Baby Steps
A critical aspect for understanding the nexus between war and the economy in a
(former) Yugoslav context is the role played by the pre-existing, ‘self-management’-
based economy. Different from the centralized Soviet model, the Yugoslav system
encouraged the consolidation of local economic elites and a clientelistic system that
usually followed ethnic demarcations. This had clear implications for conflict
patterns: by ignoring the legacy of this system one could hardly understand the case
of Fikret Abdic´, the Muslim leader of the ‘Bihac´ pocket’ in north-western Bosnia.
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Abdic´ was an influential businessman with good relations with the Krajina Serbs. He
ended up living in Croatia after mobilizing an army that stood against Sarajevo’s
more uncompromising line toward international diplomatic plans. Interestingly,
Abdic´’s self-styled ‘minister of foreign affairs’ was for some time an Italian truck
driver from Lucca, Tuscany.
Such a grotesque outcome was not part of an immutable script. The last attempt
to adopt badly needed reforms and mobilize young political cadres at the time of
the government of Ante Markovic´ was boycotted by a de facto alliance between
conservative party clienteles and new nationalist actors. When key international
players withdrew their political and financial support for the reform plan on grounds
of instability, the road to violent provocations was opened (Woodward, 1995).
While nationalism derailed the path of democratization, the introduction of a market
economy coincided with the onset of plundering: the conquest of the levers of
political power in a system based on social property became synonymous with the
opportunity to control the process of allocation of property rights. Armed factions
provided their services in the process. In the years to come, big and small self-styled
republics with self-styled ministries systematically enacted predatory measures to
ensure control over family savings and productive resources, as well as through
covert and illegal channels to consolidate their grip on the territory.
The way in which one may speak of ‘war economy’ in the context of the Balkan
wars differs radically from the traditional notion of ‘mobilization of all productive
resources for the war effort’: as soon as the nationalists rose to power questions such
as the slump in GDP disappeared from the public debate. The outbreak of war meant
the annihilation of the economy, mass unemployment and high local instability. The
new regimes abolished all intermediate political bodies, banned trade unions, and
used the black market to plunder and reallocate wealth. The disappearance of fiscal
extraction meant that in order to sustain the cost of war, the economy moved from
production to predation.
Along with Tilly’s (1985) thesis on state formation as organized crime, Thomas
Gallant (1999) has examined the way in which in modern times bandits facilitated
the process of state making before being co-opted within state structures. The
mushrooming of different types of militias in ex-Yugoslavia (Bougarel, 1996a: 103)
can be interpreted as part of the process of decomposition and recomposition of the
state’s monopoly on force, and as a bridge toward new armies and new forms of
political legitimacy. This process can also be seen as ‘the rise of the parastate’
(Liotta, 2000: 26–7) – i.e., a force acting against the state, within the state or in
place of the state by laying claims of succession to an expiring order by seeking to
transform itself into a state or to align with larger states. If one focuses on the
historical trajectory of modern state sovereignty, the role played by international
piracy, chartered companies with licence to wage war, and privateering practices,
then the Balkan wars assume a familiar colouration. It comes as no surprise that
across the sieges implicit and explicit economic and military deals were quite
frequent. The defence of Sarajevo was first organized by street gangs, which were
physically eliminated as the monopoly of force was reconstructed around the
Bosnian state Armija. As Thompson (1989) convincingly illustrates, after being used
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by state powers to reinforce their sovereignty prerogatives, such agents were
eventually liquidated or neutralized as the state’s monopoly became complete and
the international order changed.
The result of war activities is the drawing of new social and ethno-territorial
borders, and the establishment of an all-encompassing mafia system based on the
docility of a population that is both intimidated and assisted through clientelistic
channels. Illicit practices are a fundamental pillar of this system. In order to
understand how all this came about, and appreciate possible mutations in the
process, one has to set out from an historical contextualization of the role that the
Balkan region has vis-a`-vis the international illicit sector.
Well-Trodden Old Paths
In the late nineteenth century opium was extensively cultivated in Central Anatolia
and in the Macedonian region, and it constituted a major share of Ottoman exports.
In the Balkans, the growth of the opium derivative market accompanied the
dissolution of empires, and the parallel emergence of new state borders.
International efforts to regulate the drug trade hark back to the treaties of 1925 and
1931, whose main, immediate impact was to transfer the flow of drugs into illicit
channels. When the big western chemical industries gave birth to an international
cartel, traditional producers for European markets such as Turkey and (first)
Yugoslavia found themselves cut out: Ankara and Belgrade then cooperated, trying
to strengthen their position in a contracting economic sector and developing illegal
channels that intercepted a demand coming from smaller European plants. The
manufacturing companies that were closed down in Europe would invariably be
moved to Turkey, while any blow to Turkish production would be followed by the
appearance of Bulgarian manufactures and refineries. The drug trade was already
endowed with quite flexible structures (Chassagne, 2004).
In the wake of World War II, a myriad of formal and informal channels
constituted what became known as the ‘Balkan Route’. After the war, the Yugoslav
federation extracted significant advantages from its location as a geopolitical buffer
between the two blocs. This had implications for profits coming from illicit trades,
too. By the early 1970s the ‘French connection’, which smuggled Turkish heroin to
the big North American cities via laboratories located in Marseille, was dismantled.
As a consequence the Turkish organizations pointed their attention to Western
Europe: the Italian mafia, so far an intermediary, adapted part of the logistical
structures used in tobacco contrabbando to the new heroin market, thereby
becoming a partner of the Turkish criminal groups. As a consequence, securing
control over the Balkan land routes became crucial. At the very moment in which the
‘French connection’ became history, 70 per cent of the morphine travelling from
Turkey to Europe went by land through Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (Lamour and
Lamberti, 1972).
The historical ‘Balkan route’ runs between Istanbul and Sofia (with Skopje as a
variant), then reaches Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. In this context Bosnia and
Herzegovina – the bedrock of Yugoslav defence strategies – becomes an important
188 F. Strazzari
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
UI
 E
ur
op
ea
n U
niv
ers
ity
 In
sti
tut
e] 
at 
02
:10
 26
 A
pr
il 2
01
2 
point de passage for drugs transiting towards Austria, Italy and Hungary
(Pietrostefani, 2003: 236). The amelioration of the road networks, the growth of
tourism and the signing of the convention on international road transport (TIR)
facilitated the exchange between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Western Europe.
Secret services and affiliated paramilitary groups typically provided the junction
between the criminal and the political. In Turkey the concept code-named ‘deep
state’ illustrates the connivance that exists between the security apparatus, militant
nationalists, and the network of protection and services that involves heroin barons.1
While even the collapsing Albanian regime sponsored some activities such as
cigarette smuggling, the most blatant illustration probably comes from Bulgaria.
Here already during the 1960s the secret services established import–export
societies2 as a cover for clandestine transactions (in arms, drugs, and money) that
would end up attracting all sorts of international traffickers, thus extorting profits
and eventually exerting control over local drug smuggling routes (Chassagne, 2004:
151). After the transition, former elements of the security apparatus became key
figures in an underground dominated by insurance companies and ex-wrestlers. A
long trail of blood was left in Sofia during the ‘gangster war’ of 2002–03. Among
those who started their lucrative activities with deposits siphoned from party
channels and who ended up assassinated is the tycoon Ilya Pavlov, owner of the
giant Multigroup Corporation.3 Other biographies took a radically different course.
In the case of the karate champion Boiko Borisov, who served the Ministry of
Interior during the 1980s, after setting up a security firm that guarded Czar Simeon II
among others, Borisov was appointed General of the Internal Police Force. His
immense popularity helped him win election as mayor of Sofia in 2005.4
The imposition of the arms embargo5 on the Yugoslav republics in 1991 is the
act that marks the grand entre´e of transnational organized crime onto the
Yugoslav stage (Gambino and Grimaldi, 1995). An embargo meant demand for
logistics and know-how, while political fluidity meant that the time had come to
take risks. A memorandum handed in 1994 to the Slovenian President Drnovsek
estimated arm trafficking to and through Slovenia to almost equal the Republic’s
budget. A protagonist of this business, according to the Slovenian press, was
Aleksander Oman, a Slovenian expatriate to Australia who had become honorary
consul of Liberia in Ljublijana. At the beginning of 1991 the number two of
Yugoslav customs, Peter Rajic´, drew a clear conclusion from the observation of
the weapons that drug trafficking organizations were exporting to Yugoslavia
thanks to colossal deals that were made in Western Europe, Hungary and the then
Czechoslovakia: ‘all this makes one suppose that war will be of unprecedented
violence’ (Auchlin, 1993).
Croatia Shows the Flag: The ‘Balkan Route’ during the 1990s
An Interpol report on the year 1990, issued in 1991, praised the Croatian police for
being the most efficient in Europe in carrying out activities to suppress drug
trafficking. One year later the report from this source signalled a slump in heroin
seizures on Croatian territory (Rastello, 2000: 172).
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One way of making sense of this data is to consider the way in which, as war was
being decided, illegal activities appeared to become vital for sustaining the
secessionist effort (James, 1992). In particular, Croatian Herzegovinan circles –
which soon turned out to be the main stakeholders in Tudjman’s ruling party in
Zagreb – began to demand a policy of non-interference in their illicit activities,
which often had to do with the procurement of weapons through the mobilization of
diaspora lobbying (see infra). Until 1990, Belgrade’s establishment had been
presenting itself as an efficient guarantor vis-a`-vis the international drug trade
networks; in doing so, it had been able to extract a significant profit from trafficking
activities that were accompanied by corruption and big money-laundering
investments. Evidence stemming from Italian and Austrian police sources confirms
that Yugoslav federal authorities were involved, and that they would in fact extract
profits by granting the safety of the loads (Rumiz, 1993).
The strategy adopted by the new Croatian elite had been one of upsetting the
existing equilibrium by hampering and disrupting the flow of heroin that
traditionally transited along the ‘Balkan route’. The stakes were large: according to
Interpol, during the 1980s approximately 70 per cent of the heroin consumed in
Western Europe was channelled along this axis (Provvisionato, 2000: 92). Until the
secession, therefore, challenging the faltering federative structures was part of
Zagreb’s strategy of opposing Belgrade’s reforms, which implied a re-centralization
of the country. In this phase, the seizures of drugs on Croatian territory marked the
emergence of an increasingly self-confident political power. Eventually, the
independence of Croatia meant that the influx of money that could be extracted from
the river of narcotics originating in Turkey aroused the appetites of the new political
elite.6 For Zagreb it was no longer the time for interdiction strategies, or for
challenging the criminal underground. It was now time to play a new game in the
role of protagonist. Austrian officers registered the strengthening of Croatian
criminal clans, whose logistical bases were located mainly in Herzegovina, in direct
contact with the Hrvatsko Vijec´e Obrane (HVO, Croation Defence Council) militias
(AEGD, 2002). A new, unprecedented route was opened then between South
America and the Dalmatian coast. Diaspora groups that were mobilized for this
purpose (Santoro, 2004) later became the main beneficiaries of the process of
privatization of public companies that the Tudjman regime promoted.
In open violation of the embargo, weapons entered Croatia from many quarters,
each time with the involvement of Western secret services and each time with public
denial on the part of western governments. In August 1991, while the media spread
Tudjman’s cri de douleur for Croatia being left unarmed at the mercy of ‘Serbian
communist repression’, arsenals in Zagreb were already in good shape: 100,000
rifles had been bought from East Germany a few weeks before its regime collapsed,
while hundreds of Stingers and anti-tank missiles were reported to have arrived from
Austria and Italy, either illegally or through the classical method of triangulation.7
According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the previous year Austria had imported from
Spain five times the number of Astra pistols actually needed. As of 1991, the
Croatian police were supplied with Astra pistols. A large proportion of the ex-Soviet
arms that Croatia obtained (Mig21, tanks T72 and helicopters Mi24) were in fact
190 F. Strazzari
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
UI
 E
ur
op
ea
n U
niv
ers
ity
 In
sti
tut
e] 
at 
02
:10
 26
 A
pr
il 2
01
2 
coming from Germany. In Novi Cˇakovci, a strategic military base near Vukovar
(seized by the Croat National Guard), was supplied with missiles – and therefore
able to launch against Serbia. On 28 July 1991, Yugoslav Mig29 attacked the base
where, according to media reports, a team of 19 German instructors had recently
arrived. Germany denied the fact, but a subsequent cancellation of an air transit
request left many doubts (Gambino and Grimaldi, 1995: 100). All sorts of
mercenaries and obscure characters contributed to the Croat cause. When the
famous Colonel MacKenzie died in Sierra Leone (February 1995), Soldier of
Fortune magazine published a picture showing him active in Bosnia in 1994
alongside US trainers (Gambino and Grimaldi, 1995: 90). Eventually, Operation
Storm, through which the Croats re-conquered the Krajina region, demonstrated how
a country under embargo had managed to arm itself with the most sophisticated
weaponry, and how it had received military know-how through US private security
companies such as MPRI. Between 1991 and 1995 Zagreb was able to devote 40 per
cent of its budget to military expenditures.8
Tellingly, one can find evidence of how emissaries of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra felt
increasingly at home along the Croatian coast. Giambattista Licata – a major
exponent of the Sicilian clan Fidanzati and of the mafia del Brenta rooted in
northern Italy – was headquartered near Rijeka. He was in possession of a Croatian
passport and operated in connection with known extreme right militants. By
intercepting Licata, the Venetian investigators dismantled an illegal channel of arms
procurement worth an estimated $50 million. The weapons were being shipped from
Israel to Croatian ports (Gambino and Grimaldi, 1995: 26–9). In these years, Italian
mafias were losing protection because of the mani pulite anti-corruption campaign
in Italy, which decapitated the entire political system. The response was an
unprecedented mafia offensive launched by the cupola of Cosa Nostra: when the
judge Giovanni Falcone, the symbol of the anti-mafia campaign, was killed with his
wife and escort on the highway at Capaci (Palermo), the Semtex that was employed
for the explosion was of Croatian provenance.9
At this point the star of the ‘Balkan route’ was no longer shining. Far too many
predatory, opposing interests were now demanding royalties in an unpredictable
and increasingly fragmented geopolitical configuration. The mushrooming of
territorial militias and roadblocks, the outbreak of war, and the imposition of stricter
sanctions on rump-Yugoslavia were all elements that made the ‘Balkan route’ look
increasingly unpredictable, and a better investment for drugs entrepreneurs.
Just Across the River: The ‘Albanian Economic Miracle’
In Albania, these years were marked by the rise to power of the Democratic Party led
by Sali Berisha, formerly the doctor of Enver Hoxha, and the interest of the northern
fares.10 This change occurred in a dramatically evolving institutional and social
context where the concept of ‘illegal’ – to put it euphemistically – was highly
amorphous. Once again, this political change had deep consequences on the local
criminal landscape. After decades of hegemony of southern fis, the previously
marginalized northern clans were now in control of the capital and of the state.
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During the cold war, the border with Kosovo and Montenegro had been kept
under strict control, if not sealed. The fall of the Yugoslav and Albanian regimes, the
vagaries of the transition, the existence of inter-Albanian family bonds, and the wide
asymmetry in economic standards made this border quite permeable. At the same
time, geographical remoteness and an impervious morphology explain the relevance
of this quiet area in a moment in which the Serbo-Montenegrin federation was struck
by an international embargo sanctioning its role in a war that was being fought
elsewhere.
Contrary to the expectation that sanctions and political tension in Kosovo would
make the border hermetically sealed, exchanges soared all along it. For example, it is
estimated that in the period 1993 to 1994, when approximately 200 boats per day
were crossing the waters of the lake of Shkode¨r towards the Montenegrin town of
Plavnica, oil-smuggling activities accounted for a daily influx of approximately $1
million (CSD, 2002: 14). An average of nearly 500,000 litres of fuel were smuggled
into Montenegro each day across the river Buna, thanks to the complicity of the local
customs and police forces (Ameye, 2006: 68). On their way back, the boats carried
other licit goods such as tons of flour from Vojvodina.11 Quite tellingly, the only
media that spoke of Albanian–Yugoslav illegal trade were Croatian newspapers.
Likewise, the press close to the Albanian opposition denounced the way the breach
of the UN embargo had been agreed upon directly by Albanian President Berisha
with his Montenegrin counterpart Momir Bulatovic´ in September 1993.12 If one
considers that ten years later gasoline smuggling would remain a pillar of Kosovo’s
economy, then the lasting salience of these mechanisms becomes apparent. The
economic chaos linked to the difficulty of transitions and privatization, the existence
of embargoes, and the widely differing prices of petrol products in the Balkan region
represented the most favourable conditions for a number of actors to emerge and
operate at different levels of legality (CSD, 2003).
One pillar of the Serbian–Albanian pax mafiosa was undoubtedly the axis that
came into being between Zˇeliko Razˇnatovic´, alias Arkan, and Enver Hajin. While
the former was a well-known Serbian criminal boss and a paramilitary chief who in
Pristina had won the seat to the Yugoslav Parliament, Hajin was an ex-officer of
Enver Hoxha’s secret police who had become a prominent figure among the
Albanian criminal bosses operating around the Shkode¨r lake. Along with licit goods
that avoided taxation or international sanctions, the southern borders saw the arrival
of arms and Turkish heroin. In particular, narcotics began to beat the old routes of
tobacco smuggling, reaching the Adriatic ports of Bar (Montenegro) and Durre¨s
(Albania).
At the same time, Kosovar businessmen were increasingly seen in Tirana, where
an explosive admixture of politics, private interests, and illicit transactions was
under preparation. As revealed by a number of intelligence and police sources, Vefa,
the most important Albanian holding until the implosion of 1997, was heavily
involved in both funding the national political system and in the exchange of drugs
for weapons. Thanks to contacts with the Italian mafia from Puglia – the Sacra
Corona Unita – its profits grew exponentially throughout the 1990s and its
managers even developed an investment strategy in southern Italy (Gumbel, 1997).13
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In and around Slobodan Milosevic’s sanctions-stricken regime, national interests
were militating in favour of much more indulgence than overtly admitted vis-a`-vis
Albanian networks and neighbours. Criminal organizations provided all the
necessary services, and Albanian organizations too benefited from high-level
protection. The existence of a situation of mutual gain and connivance must be fully
appreciated if one wants to reach a sound understanding of the doldrums in Kosovo
until the escalation of 1998. On the one hand, one can observe repression, as well as
the self-organization and self-ghettoization dynamics that characterized the
existence of the underground Republic of Kosova. On the other hand, however, in
a situation in which parallel political structures and shadow economies dominated
the scene, the province had grown into a crossroad for profitable illicit trades.
Contrary to widespread perceptions, indigence was never a major problem in
Kosovo, thanks to the existence of a dense network of private business and assistance
activities. By late 1998, the average income among Albanian Kosovars had become
two or three times higher than the average (public) salary of a Serbian citizen of
Prisˇtina (Morozzo della Rocca, 1999: 64).
Evidence of Albanian Kosovars involved in drug smuggling can be traced back to
investigations conducted by the Swiss police in 1991. Yet the criminal profile
assumed by Kosovo’s organizations is best illustrated by a number of operations
conducted throughout Europe between 1992 and 1997. A joint operation with the
Italian police led to the arrest of Kosovar heroin dealers in Skopje in 1994
(Milivoijevic, 1995). Operation Macedonia, a joint effort of Italian, Swiss and
German police, shed light on financial links in Zurich, pointing to the collaboration
that emerged between 1995 and 1998 between Kosovar mafia clans and the Italian
‘ndrangheta. European law enforcement agencies began to issue reports that
documented how ethnic Albanians had become the second biggest community after
Turks detained for narco-trafficking. The close link between heroin trafficking and
the financing of the Kosovo liberation movement has been documented in different
countries, at different levels, and by many intelligence reports and journalistic
sources (Klebnikov, 2000).
Albanian-speaking mafias were the first foreign criminal organizations in Italy
that endowed themselves with ‘fire squads’ to settle accounts whenever a transaction
went bad. In January 1999 alone they killed nine times in two weeks in Milan. Year
after year the city of Milan, already an important hub for drug distribution, rose to
the role of main referent for what has been tellingly labelled the ‘golden triangle’ of
Prisˇtina–Tirana–Podgorica, an area where 5 tons of heroin would transit per year,
according to investigative sources (Colaprico, 2005). In 1998 the Italian police
dismantled eight organizations and arrested 100 Kosovars, charging them with
trafficking in heroin and arms.14 In 2004, one-third of the heroin seized in Italy came
from operations conducted in this city. The arrest of Albanian politicians tied to
Berisha’s milieu, of important Kosovo bosses (Agim Gashi in Milan) and leading
figures of the ‘ndrangheta (Giuseppe Morabito and Domenico Branca) revealed the
organizational capabilities and the modalities of territorial control of a criminal
network that was based along the Po Valley but extended throughout the continent.
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Branca was arrested in Bratislava in 1995, as he was working with Albanian-
speaking clans.
Branca’s arrest took place along the so-called ‘oriental’ or ‘northern Balkan
route’, which offered alternative and safe bases through Bulgaria, well north of the
Danube. Operation Africa, carried out by the Italian police in June 1998, unmasked
a number of tracks converging in Bratislava, documenting how, by the second half
of the 1990s, heroin was no longer running on big Turkish TIRs across Yugoslavia
(Omicron, 2001). A more sophisticated net of small couriers had come into being
under the control of the Kosovo groups in alliance with the ‘ndrangheta along the
Turkey–Budapest–Bratislava axis. Capital would arrive in Vienna already clean,
accompanied by bosses that had changed their clothes and were now wearing
elegant Italian fashions (Barbacetto, 1999).
A ramification of this ‘northern Balkan route’ goes through Bulgaria, and then
into Serbia. In December 1996, at the border post of Dimitrovgrad-Gradina, the
Yugoslav police intercepted 365 kilograms of heroin on board a truck carrying green
peppers from Plovdiv. To fully appreciate this figure, one can compare it with the 20
kilograms that the Yugoslav police declared they had seized during 1998, or with the
14 kilograms intercepted by the Macedonian police in 1999. The Plovdiv-based
society turned out to be owned by Nazim Delegu, an Albanian from Kosovo who
was known as a godfather of a wide mafia net extending to the former Yugoslav
territories, Albania and Italy (Miletitch, 1998: 124).
Kosovar Albanian organizations won the underground war over the drug market
against Albanian challengers from Albania. A note from the US Drug Enforcement
Agency dated 1997 estimated that the Kosovo Albanian mafia controlled business
worth three times the GDP of the state of Albania (Provvisionato, 2000: 96). Kosovo
Albanian investors even penetrated the southern Mediterranean route, i.e. via Greece
and Cyprus, according to the Italian Direzione Investigativa Antimafia. As growth
dynamics unfolded, and the need for more sophisticated and flexible network
structures became apparent, clan origin and territorial reference became less and less
relevant, and organizations became increasingly mixed.
The organizational model of Albanian criminal clans is similar to those of close-
knit ‘ndrine, the criminal families of the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta, a world protagonist
in intermediation, particularly rooted in Colombia and South America in general.
Affiliates come from the same family or village, and the structure is made up of
horizontal relations among several interchangeable bosses who refer to a supreme
boss. Once they eliminated rival gangs in Europe, the Kosovars positioned
themselves in higher levels of trafficking. Thus Albanian-speaking organizations
emancipated themselves from the role of being a mere connection ring between the
Turkish mafia and western markets. The strategic alliance with the Italians (and even
with Russian and Ukrainian mafias) made these organizations autonomous actors
able to diversify investment, beginning for example to deal in cocaine.
By the end of the ‘black decade’ Albanian mafias were protagonists on the global
scene. Operazione Pristina was carried out by the Italian police (with the support of
Europol analysts) in several countries of Europe, South America and Central Asia.
In early 2001, a Colombian–Albanian axis was dismantled. It was geared to ship
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some 40 tons of cocaine a year thanks to the protection offered by some high-level
police officers in Tirana.15
Kosovo Flares Up
An early signal of the direction that events in Kosovo were about to take was the
murder in 1996 of the aforementioned Enver Hajin at the hand of Darko Asanin, who
shared with Arkan the reputation of boss and war hero. New equilibria were forming
and the wind was changing. In Albania, Berisha turned his attention toward Europe,
most notably Germany, thus irritating some of its early US sponsors. Perhaps this
step was taken in an excess of self-confidence resting on a ‘financial miracle’ fuelled
by speculative capital. These speculations were pioneered by figures such as Hajdin
Sejdia, a Switzerland-based Kosovar businessman who administered and spent some
$40 million, mainly stolen from peasants and workers’ saving. An IMF inspection
team visited the country and announced the storm to come: the bankruptcy of
financial societies meant the disappearance of the savings of the majority of
Albanians who had trusted in the ‘capitalist miracle’ whereby ‘money breeds
money’. The wave of panic that followed in March and April 1997 is remembered as
a quasi-civil war during which hundreds were killed. Berisha’s party left its
fingerprints on the financial pyramids; Fatos Nano – the Socialist leader who was
then under arrest – fled from prison, while the south of the country was burning.
Unlike Berisha, Nano had solid connections with the southern fis, and his return to
power seemed to imply that Albania would be less involved in the Kosovar and
Macedonian imbroglio.
The implosion of Albania, and the evaporation of its police and military officers,
had obvious implications for illicit activities and transborder trafficking. The border
between Albania and Macedonia became entirely permeable, following the trail of
the ancient Via Egnatia, the road connecting the two capitals of the Roman Empire,
Rome and Byzantium. The lake of Ohrid offered a way out for the Turkish heroin
that was now being diverted away from Kosovo. Not unlike what had happened with
the traditional ‘Balkan route’ at the time of the war in Croatia and Bosnia, the whole
system of Kosovo connivance and collusion had become too costly and
unpredictable compared to possible new splinter routes.
At Dayton, international diplomacy had carefully avoided addressing the Kosovo
issue, and in the United States the republican candidate Bob Dole, a strong advocate
of Kosovo’s independence, had lost the elections. Therefore the Kosovar Albanian
elite’s gradualist project of constructing a parallel state, a parallel economy and a
parallel society was now at a dead end. The 3 per cent income tax that each Kosovar
emigre´ was contributing to the ‘Republic of Kosova’ via its government in exile led
by Bujar Bukoshi ceased to be poured into the coffers of the Pristina-based, non-
violent presidency of Ibrahim Rugova, who therefore found himself cornered. The
weapons that had just disappeared from Albanian garrisons and depots were cheap
and easy to obtain through the porous borders of the mountains separating Albania,
Macedonia and Kosovo. The trafficking route through Kosovo was becoming
obsolete: the Albanian ports of Saranda, Vlora and Durre¨s were now offering a more
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convenient outlet. The new routes connected Bulgaria with Macedonia and Albania.
The Macedonian city of Tetovo, close to Kosovo, stood in the middle.
The single most visible phenomenon linked to organized criminality in Albania is
probably the blossoming of sea smuggling, in a continuum between Italian and
Albanian organized groups. The phenomenon hinged on the rise of a new social
profile, the skafisti – i.e. young drivers of speedboats across the Adriatic–Ionian
Sea.16 Up to 1996, dozens of boats would leave each night from the city of Vlora,
thus reaching the scale of a social phenomenon propelled by the adoption of laws
against migration to the EU. Kosovars were charged almost double the price of local
Albanians. Then Kurds began to arrive, along with others from the Middle East, and
eventually even Chinese, with prices that skyrocketed. Human smuggling to the EU
was providing the organizations that dealt with it some $3 to $4 billion per year
(Kojdheli, 2006).
In 1998 guns began to fire in the mountains of Kosovo. The Albanian leader Fatos
Nano, who had so far been harshly criticized by Albano-Macedonians and Kosovars,
turned into a fervent sponsor of the Ushtria C¸lirimtare Kosove¨s (UC¸K). Parallel to
this, in an attempt to gain some direct relevance, Berisha made an attempt to create a
professional army (FARK) in alliance with Bukoshi, and a brief underground battle
was fought between Kosovo Albanian factions, also on Albanian territory. After
some murderous episodes, the UC¸K formations of Hashim Thac¸i and Ramush
Haradinaj remained almost unrivalled and claimed territorial control throughout
the province as soon as open hostilities ceased thanks to an extended net of self-
appointed mayors and ex-combatants.
In spite of a certain reticence on the part of the US anti-drug agencies in admitting
it, it is a fact that in the aftermath of war in Kosovo drug traffickers consolidated
their influence and increased heroin trafficking, forging links with other drug cartels.
The existence of connections between political militants and illicit activities is not
difficult to prove. An investigation conducted in 2006 on an organization providing
‘all inclusive’ packages for illegal migration ran into intercepted phone
conversations in which the protagonists of the business were narrating the way in
which they actively contributed to staging the violent incidents that swept the
province in March 2004 (Castaldo, 2006).
In the Underground of Belgrade
As the contours of the Balkan landscapes were being remoulded also by the flowing
of underground criminal rivers, the states became increasingly family affairs, in
which virtually any actor with a role to play was personally entangled with all other
actors. The distinction between legal and illegal, as well as between institutional and
informal. became increasingly irrelevant. After years of sanctions and regional
turmoil, the borders between white, grey and black economies looked extremely
fuzzy. The war mood and the survival imperatives that shaped public and private
perceptions by 1999, in coincidence with NATO’s bombing campaign, marked the
overcoming of formal institutional dialectics and the sliding of political life into pure
power politics and repression of dissent. The shrinking of political and economic
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spaces meant a dramatic rise in the killings of prominent politicians and
businessmen (Strazzari and Dognini, 2000).
Descending into Belgrade’s mafia underground, one can note that the structures of
Serbian organized crime throughout the Yugoslav wars rest in a significant way
upon pre-existing networks. These were connected to the counter-espionage
apparatus, the police and the army, circles that often had been employed in the past
in the not-so-invisible war against a host of enemies abroad. Beginning in the late
1960s common criminal elements were recruited and granted benefits if they
contributed to the underground war with anti-Yugoslav e´migre´s (Kusovac, 2002).
The latter were to be found among those nationalist circles that managed to place
their men in leading positions during the secessionist wars.
A good example is Gojko Sˇusˇak, Croatian minister of defence. Susak used to be a
businessman in Ottawa, Canada, a position from which he had been particularly
active in organizing anti-Yugoslav provocations, the funding of nationalist militant
factions, arms procurement operations through Latin America, and eventually
violent incidents in the early days of war. Among other activities, militant Croats
from Herzegovina had been strategically manipulating the remarkable flows of
pilgrims visiting the Catholic sanctuary of Medjugorje (Rastello, 1998: 63–77). In
February 1991, when he was still minister of immigration, Susak invited the entire
Croatian diaspora to contribute to the defence of Croatia’s independence by sending
contributions to a Geneva-based UBS bank account. The account soon contained up
to DM150 million, and it remained in use until Susak’s death in 1998.17 A year
before the ruling nationalist party had won the elections thanks to massive funds
hidden in a remote bank of Zupanja, where firms doing business with the Ministry of
Defence were asked to deposit bribes (Hedl, 2003).18
With the spiralling of wars and sanctions, the Yugoslav state began to collaborate
with local mafia organizations that had nothing to do with the security apparatus.
Meanwhile, Milosˇevic´’s government was quite efficiently raking up family savings
and foreign currency, resources that were needed to sustain wars and withstand
international isolation. This was made possible through the systematic manipulation
of monetary policy, through speculation, and through the strict control of street
money-changers. Milosˇevic´ was originally a banker, and banking societies revealed
themselves to be Trojan horses for securing a firmer grip on the productive
apparatus. In 1990 a campaign named ‘Loans to Serbia’ was launched to collect hard
currency by promising fabulous returns. The newly launched private bank
Karicbank was the heart of the operation. Predictably, KaricBank was sunk, while
the money (an estimated $500 million) ended up in Cypriot banks, opening new
channels that would attract money coming from drug trafficking in the whole
Mediterranean region. The entire mechanism would fund the wars to come.
Parallel to this, in Serbia,Dafiment controlled money-changers and provided them
with freshly printed currency, speculating on hyperinflation, and forcing Serb
industries to be first indebted, then controlled by the Dafiment’s own financial
cupola. Similar is the action of Jugoskandik, whose director was in control of black
markets and weapons deals with Israel. The sinking of Jugoskandikmeant the loss of
savings for thousands of citizens in a climate of total impunity, while its director fled
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to Israel (Rastello, 1998). Significantly the economic crimes of the regime would
remain virtually ignored even in the post-Milosˇevic´ era.
Looking at Belgrade’s financial situation, the close relationship with Cyprus
banks, which had played a crucial role in the survival of the country,19 was
progressively interrupted as a result of closer international inspections conducted at
US prodding. Nicosia, which had already offered shelter to capital escaping the
Lebanese war, and easy financial access for mafiosi capital from Bulgaria and other
Balkan countries, was now paving its accession to the European Union. Survival for
the Yugoslav treasury came thanks to the privatization deal that was concluded not
quite transparently with the Italian and Greek companies Telecom and Ote.
With the economic indicators plummeting, no access to international finance, and
Yugoslav forces increasingly under fire by UC¸K snipers, the costs of maintaining the
massive security apparatus in Kosovo had become intolerably high. Milosˇevic´ must
have been well aware of the fact that the implicit pact with Rugova, whose party
controlled parallel Albanian institutions, was not fixed, and keeping control over two
million Albanians who had embarked upon an intransigent political project was not
a realistic goal. Seen in this light, the widespread idea that Milosˇevic´ intended to
keep a direct grip on the whole region is probably misleading. What is sure is that by
1999 everybody was ready, so the war could begin.
As Cypriot accounts were disclosed, Belgrade turned its attention toward China,
in particular to Hong Kong and Shanghai, where Yugoslav consulates were
opened.20 By the time NATO attacked Serbia, the Chinese presence in Belgrade was
quite visible. While the influx of Chinese emigrants of rural background was no
novelty, Yugoslavia became a destination for Chinese businessmen engaged in key
sectors of post-war reconstruction. In this light, NATO’s ‘accidental bombing’ of
the Chinese embassy to Yugoslavia raised several questions. In the end, payment
problems Belgrade had with Sinochem – a provider of Libyan, Iranian and Russian
oil – were overcome (Rozen, 2000), and despite the devastating attacks on oil
refineries and chemical plants, fuel tanks and bottles for sale disappeared relatively
soon from Belgrade’s streets. At the same time, the influx of Chinese commodities
(shoes, clothing, low-tech items, food) can be situated in the wide grey area between
market and underground economy. Along with the production and import of
counterfeit goods (heavily concentrated in the region of Sandjak), the expansion of
this sector performed a double function. First, it allowed relatively high profits by
virtue of low costs. Second, and most important, it ensured a modicum of social
stability, meeting the need for consumer goods.
Going back to the question of international sanctions, the abovementioned case of
the warlord Arkan remains emblematic of how the embargo was turned into an asset
for criminal gangs. At the moment of his assassination in Belgrade, the criminal
profile of Arkan – whose Tigers are accused of the worst crimes in Croatia, Bosnia,
andKosovo – stood in striking contrast to that of a blood-thirsty fanatic, andwasmore
in line with that of a skilled service provider. Aligned with the regime, he managed a
good share of the pie of oil and derivatives. Increasingly active in the importation to
Serbia of German and Swedish-made fertilizers through Hungary, his Montenegrin
acquaintances finally allowed his involvement in the cigarette-smuggling business
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(Staletovic´, 2000). The binomial sanctions borders in a context of shrinking state
budget became a crucial factor for the Milosevic family, including not only the
presidential couple, but also the sonMarko, who was heavily involved in transborder
activities. In short, bymanipulating the embargo, theMilosˇevic´ family gained control
of all the financial and commercial arteries that connect the country with the outside
world. While the relationship between sanctions and the crumbling of the regime on
5 October 2000 remains open to debate, the fact that the strategy pursued vis-a`-vis
the ‘Serbian question’ has contributed heavily to reinforcing the dynamics of
criminalization of the public sphere can hardly be denied (Zucconi, 2001).
The fall of Milosevic was accompanied by rumours of deals that the democratic
leaders had cut with Belgrade’s underground to secure a smooth path to regime
change. The existing continuities between organized crime and institutions in Serbia
entered the spotlight when President Djindjic was assassinated on 13 March 2002.
According to many analysts the smoke-screen that had protected the nexus
between war crimes, criminality and political power that led to the end of
Yugoslavia was eventually being cleared away. Others, by contrast, cast doubts
on the way in which the anti-crime campaign was conducted, showing how its
protagonists were the very same high officials whose ‘inactivity’, to use a
euphemism, had been part of the problem. At the end of Operation Sabljia strong
ambiguities were still present in the entire sphere of the security apparatus (Rotta,
2003). By taking aim at the reform impulse, Djindjic’s killers demonstrated that the
vestiges of the politico-criminal system were still alive and able to destabilize the
country. The crisis of representation and the institutional stalemate that followed
lasted until 2006, when a new constitution was adopted as Montenegro made its
final step toward secession, and the negotiations over the status of Kosovo were in
full swing.
Montenegro: Smuggling Independence
The efficient management of illegal traffic entails a number of activities that can
engender frictions if local counter-powers stand up and claim border-control
prerogatives. In this respect, the dispute that emerged in 2000 between Belgrade’s
federal authorities and the Montenegrin government over the patrolling of the
borders (including Podgorica airport) and the Serbian economic blockade on
Montenegro, can also be read as friction over ‘who is in control of what’ in a state-
making perspective.
After the end of the NATO bombing campaign, which quite tellingly spared the
coastal area, Montenegro was de facto exempted from international sanctions, and
adopted a pro-Western economic course heavily supported by US financial transfers.
Up to this moment, the secessionist milieus gravitating around the premier Milo
Djukanovic have been trying to distance themselves from Belgrade. Yet also given
the size of the country, in parting company with Milosˇevic´ Djukanovic´ ended up in
the hands of the criminal organizations based along the Adriatic coast.
Thanks to the entrepreneurial initiative of societies such as Zetatrans or Monti,21
the Montenegrin Republic became the most important staging area for illicit loads
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heading for western markets through a number of passages from American, Swiss,
Dutch and above all Belgian depots via Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Macedonia
(Ruotolo, 1999) and later on via Greece, Cyprus and Croatia (Ruotolo, 2000).
According to a report issued by the Italian parliamentary Anti-mafia Commission,
Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds operated from Basel, Switzerland, through two
organizations. One of them, Export Two, was tasked with the sending of cigarettes to
Montenegro along channels that proved to be rather permeable to drug and weapons
smuggling as well (Abate and Crimi, 2000). While the treasury of Montenegro was
being put safely away in Switzerland along with private capital, a state tax of $10 per
case, euphemistically defined ‘on export–import’, was being levied on cigarette
smuggling.
Montenegro’s transformation into a safe haven, or perhaps a pirate colony for
Italian mafiosi of diverse affiliations, harks back to 1993. Between 1994 and 1995
some 450 protagonists of Italian organized crime found shelter around Podgorica, a
small republic that at the time had no contacts with Interpol. The tobacco business
toward Italy was then estimated to engender yearly profits of approximately $1
billion (not to mention the damage to the fiscal revenue system) and to give work to
some 26,000 people. An alarm bell rang when the head of police of Podgorica, Vaso
Bausic, was apprehended in Bari during his initiation rite into the local Sacra
Corona Unita. In 1999, the Tribunal of Napoli documented the close relationship
between the Montenegrin government and the clan headed by Ciro Mazzarella, a
camorrista who settled in Lugano, Switzerland. At the end of 1999 the investigation
brought the indictment of the then minister of foreign affairs of Montenegro, Branko
Perovic, who was charged with collusion with the Napolitan Camorra. One year
later, upon a mandate of the Italian police, the legendary Swiss referent for the huge
cigarette smuggling and money laundering business of a number of mafias, Gerardo
Cuomo, was eventually arrested in Zurich.22 Active through a host of financial
societies based in Aruba (Dutch Antilles) and Cyprus, Cuomo was the holder of an
import–export licence in the Republic of Montenegro and was able to deal directly
with tobacco multinationals. Subsequently, the police, carrying out an investigation
into illegal international trade and money laundering, brought to prison among
others a Swiss judge who was officially appointed to watch over international
smuggling and money laundering. Eventually, in November 2000 the EU
Commission announced legal moves against Philip Morris and Reynolds for their
involvement in tobacco smuggling and tax evasion.23 In 2003 the Napolitan
persecutors presented a 364-page report that documented in detail the links between
Djukanovic’s milieu and the mafia organization run by Paolo Savino. The request
for arrest was turned down given the immunity that Djukanovic enjoys as a head of
state (Bosˇkovic´, 2003a).
While helping polish up the reputation of Montenegro as a ‘Mediterranean
Tortuga’, western economic, political and security support to Podgorica has been
quite ambivalent and little evidence can be found of its effectiveness in reducing
criminal activities, whose grotesque aspects kept periodically surfacing in the
media. Being crossed by the various Balkan routes, at the end of the 1990s
Montenegro had become a land of competition between different sovereignties,
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mafias and security apparatuses. The entire people trafficking infrastructure had a
solid basis in Podgorica, and scandals concerning women trafficking and
prostitution touched high officers and Djukanovic himself. Speaking to the media
in 2003, the president declared that cigarettes were lawfully present on Montenegrin
soil, and that the government should not be held responsible for the destination of
that tobacco (Bosˇkovic´, 2003b).
The political trajectory of the country is not difficult to decipher: the debate on
abolishing corporate taxes and the incentives given to external investment speak for
themselves. The idea of an offshore Adriatic basis seem to be particularly appealing
for Russian mafias and businessmen who have shown warm support for
Djukanovic´’s bid for independence, taking a high profile role in the privatization
process (Caracciolo, 2006).
Shaky Tiles in the Macedonian Mosaic
During the brief period that separates the end of hostilities in Kosovo and the
outbreak of war in Macedonia, it became evident that the making and unmaking of
states in the region was far from concluded, and that this fluid geopolitics was
heavily nurtured by illicit activities. The very volatile situation in Montenegro lent
plenty of oxygen to criminal activities in and around Kosovo. On the other hand, in
Serbia, a hotbed of tensions was the mainly Albanian-inhabited Presˇevo valley, an
area that runs next to the border with Macedonia and that was demilitarized by the
technical agreement signed between NATO and the Yugoslav army. Here a number
of roads connect the quasi-protectorate of Kosovo with Albanian-inhabited border
cities, western Macedonia, central Serbia and Bulgaria. The illicit flows of which
this region had long been a centre (e.g., the small town of Veliki Trnovac) soon
began to suffer from Kosovo’s pacification. This consideration accompanied the
decision to blow on the fire of Albanian irredentism, so as to strengthen profitable
forms of control. For months, the Presevo demilitarized strip became a area of
dangerous instability, in which Albanian snipers were targeting Yugoslav soldiers to
claim the liberation of ‘Eastern Kosovo’. Here too, the typical profile is that of the
businessman with solid connections with the UC¸K, such as Shaban Shala (Caprile,
2000). In spite of the American presence in the territorially adjacent sector, militias
of the ‘Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac’ were even able to
launch a new guerrilla offensive in December 2000, stipulating an alliance with
Macedonian clandestine factions such as the ‘Albanian National Army’ (AKSH).
In the mainly Albanian inhabited western districts of Macedonia illegal activities
have always thrived, and incidents along the border with Albania were a problem
throughout the 1990s. During the decade, Macedonian territory acted as a ring of
intermediation, a springboard which hosted stocks and depots, thus animating all
sorts of trafficking. As the country became independent, even the pharmaceutical
industry of the Republic of Macedonia was reported to be involved in the production
of heroin (OGD, 1998).
Related to the growth of the West’s economic and military presence in the region
was the increase in criminal organizations devoted to the trafficking of women from
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Eastern Europe. In anonymous rural areas by the border young women were
deprived of their documents and sold from gang to gang, ending up temporarily
‘stocked’ before being channelled into the streets of the West. Dilaver Bojku, an
Albanian boss from the village of Veleshta, was reported to be in control of 3,000
women. Arrested, he managed to escape and find shelter in Montenegro, where he
was eventually arrested after the international community put pressure on the
government of Skopje.
Illicit transactions had a direct impact on the conflict dynamics of the Macedonian
region. In the spring of 2001, following the mutual recognition of borders between
Skopje and Belgrade and minor incidents in the mountain village of Tanusevci (right
on the Kosovo–Macedonian border), an armed offensive was launched in west
Macedonia by a newly born Macedonian branch of the UC¸K. Tellingly, Tanusˇevci
was home to Xhavit Hasani, an Albanian–Macedonian boss who had become a war
hero during the Kosovo war, transforming this area into a logistical base for the
Kosovar combatants. After four months of violence, the strategy pursued by the
local UC¸K was eventually rewarded: a number of concessions were made at
the prodding of international mediators, and the former combatants went through a
successful election, which placed them directly in the newly formed government.
Power struggles in the districts of Western Macedonia have often taken the shape
of the settling of accounts between different families who back different political
parties. In the ‘Macedonian capital of Albanian politics’ – i.e., the city of Tetovo –
local elites have long been intent on power struggles involving an impressive series
of violent episodes that have often been hastily dismissed by authorities, media and
international observers as simple ‘criminality’.
Conclusions: Paramilitaries and Peripheral Parastates
Drawing the line between legal authority and illegal challengers, and conceptualiz-
ing their relationship during the last cycle of Balkan wars is quite a complex task.
Nonetheless, some distinctive background, structural factors can be identified.
Looking at long-term continuities, for example, a distinctive pattern of collaboration
between political authorities and bands of irregulars can be traced back in time to
the period when the Balkans were under Ottoman rule. The practice of co-opting
bandits and tribesman not only as auxiliaries during war campaigns, but also for
extracting taxation, protecting trade routes, surveilling borders, or even for not
making troubles, was quite systematic (Barkey, 1994).
Arms trafficking and external intervention have deep roots too. In the Ottoman
Empire the Christian population was not allowed to carry weapons: thus the armed
prophets of national revolutions were backed externally: quite inevitably, the
channels for introducing weapons were those of contraband. Rifles were hidden
among tobacco loads carried through donkeys and mule trains (Perry, 1988). Thus
bandits, clans, and similar armed formations ‘often headed social movements that
led to the formation of the modern state in the region’ (Xenakis, 2001: 12).
In these historic dynamics licit goods often paved the way for the illicit. As
reconstructed above, during the 1990s the routes that were opened for cigarettes and
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petrol smuggling soon afterwards saw the flow of drugs and weapons, and then the
expansion to all sorts of other goods, from stolen vehicles to human beings. States
often sponsored illicit trade in the attempt to extract profits and strengthen their
influence; the fingerprints left by agents under cover in operations conducted in the
black market during the 1990s exist independently of one’s taste for the dark literary
intrigues that Eric Ambler narrated in 1939 in his The Mask of Dimitrios.
A second background factor that creates permissive conditions for illegal trade
has to do with the regional politico-economic conjuncture: the end of the socialist
system brought about social destructuration all across the Balkans. Sure, socio-
economic structures vary enormously, ranging from Yugoslav self-management, to
the Bulgarian soviet-style centralized economy, as well as the harshness of
Romanian and Albanian regimes; nevertheless, in each case the crumbling of the
political system (and the normative standards that it embodied) as well as the
transition to a market economy were turbulent processes, in which the not-so-
invisible hand of mafias came to give a hand of protection, assistance and regulation.
The reason why transborder crime became so important lies in the fact that in this
chaotic period of evanescent institutions and economic collapse, national borders
became (and for a long time would continue to be) the largest redistributing
mechanism of national wealth. If at some point nobody would collect taxes among
Kosovo Albanians, soon nobody would collect taxes, stop. Albania in this sense is an
example: here the state would not reach efficiency standards for electricity provision
and road maintenance, but dynamic entrepreneurs would soon travel in armoured
SUVs and own electric generators for each of their restaurants. The value of goods
transiting across Balkan countries reached in some cases 85 per cent of GDP (CSD,
2003). In 2001 the IMF estimated that merchandise imports were at about 80 per
cent of Kosovo’s GDP: heavy reliance on custom duties, excise and sales tax
collected only at the border made the entire system extremely vulnerable (IMF,
2001).
Third, while political and territorial fragmentation meant little or no cooperation
between neighbouring law enforcement agencies, the opposite can be said for
informal actors. The Balkans is a peninsula where communication and transport are
particularly difficult: however, this situation changed quite rapidly with the spread
of new means of private transportation. Illicit actors know the terrain quite well, and
besides having long experience of collaboration along informal, adaptive networks,
they have a stronger stake in the process: nothing would convince a conscript or a
badly paid local policeman to risk his life by going out at night trying to stand in
the way of organized smugglers. The proliferation of borders means an increased
need for skilled entrepreneurs, a rise in prices of smuggled commodities, the
dynamization of the sector, and the generalized empowerment of groups that in
some way take part in the criminal chain.
In more detail, a few trends emerge from the analysis of heroin smuggling through
the ‘Balkan route’. When the profitability of the traditional ‘Balkan route’
diminished because of the unpredictability of war-related events, the traditional
main trafficking itinerary was bifurcated, thus involving also Central European
countries. Worldwide the supply of opium from Afghanistan was steadily growing,
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and loads of heroin transported by TIR now began to be stocked in depots in the
southern Balkans (Chassagne, 2004: 154). This development meant that places that
traditionally offered a safe haven to bandits and smugglers now integrated a net of
intermediate stocking areas where the smuggled goods could stay until the next
logistical contact would be established and a mobile phone would ring. Splinter
roads multiplied: smuggling networks were diversifying their supplies and
itineraries. From here onward the distribution would be carried out in smaller
loads (5–20 kg) in private cars or bags. At the same time, a new development
occurred in response to the need for growing flexibility: all the main actors of illicit
transactions widened and diversified their activities. Arkan investing in the
smuggling of fertilizers is a case that is not dissimilar from those of the world’s
major arms intermediaries, who become active in diamonds, frozen fish, flowers,
and transport in Iraq on behalf of the US (Naim, 2005: 253).
Illuminated by Tilly’s (1985) comparative historical sociology, the modern
history of ‘state making as organized crime’ lends itself to decode the role that the
criminal sector has played in the Balkans, and still does not say all about
contemporary wars. The symbiotic nexus between war making and state making
(and the role played therein by illegal and criminal enterprises) is in permanent
mutation, as a response to the transformation of state sovereignty, intervention
practices, as well as global economic dynamics. When interviewed about the type of
economic future they would envision for the entity they were employing violence
for, the local leaders of the Bosnian Republika Srpska mentioned off-shoring, fiscal
safe havens and casinos.
Having this in mind, some tentative findings emerge from the dissection of a
decade of crime and war in the Balkans. Contrary to widespread perception, not
unlike other mafias, Balkan mafias do not come into being where the market and the
state are absent, but they rather accompany (or guide) the unfolding of market and
state structures. Far from being a ‘new challenge’ to state stability, the history of
illegal (i.e., criminal) armed groups is deeply intertwined with the emergence and
consolidation of state forms in the Balkan region: in this context the emergence and
the persistence of armed groups is not perceived as a threat to the (nation-)state, but
on the contrary it can be perceived as working in its defence. Smuggling typically
concerns commodities that are either subject to high customs fees (petrol products,
cigarettes, alcohol, cars) or banned/restricted (i.e., the exchange of weapons for
drugs; but also migrants, strategic raw materials, exotic animals, goods violating
intellectual property rights). Systematic fraud is also committed with regard to
certificates of origin to elude EU external border customs and medical controls
(CSD, 2003: 17–19). Seizures of drugs clearly show how illicit activities develop a
parasitic relationship with licit trade.
This leads to a second consideration: intermediaries win. The rise of Albanian
organized crime is probably the most visible example. The Italian ‘ndranghetisti set
the example: from the impervious Calabrian mountains the ‘ndrine carve out an
intermediation in wider international markets controlled by Cosa Nostra, acting as
couriers first, then intermediaries in cocaine dealings, eventually losing the
territorial reference and ending up determining international price ratios.
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The cohesive, family-based nature of Albanian criminal networks helps explain the
success of Albanian groups. Intermediaries provide long-distance services and
articulate flexible, decentralized networks that absorb risks and respond to
opportunity variations, thus minimizing vulnerability. The overcoming of the
traditional triangular structure and the end of the model command-control have
important implications (Naim, 2005; UN INCB 2001): aggressive contrast strategies
(e.g., Plan Colombia) may bring about local tactical successes, but have virtually no
long-term general impact on the overall market and its profitability.
The third consideration is closely linked to the second: organized crime can take
hostage the development of state structures. Criminal groups have always acted as
providers of war-related services, thus developing a vested interest in protracted,
intractable conflicts. What is new is the magnitude of profits and the opportunities
that external powers, international markets and ‘new mobilities’ can disclose vis-a`-
vis states that are increasingly small and withdrawn in terms of regulation, budget
and welfare. International efforts to regulate or prohibit goods during the 1920s
made profitability increase. A massive growth of drug markets takes place during the
1980s and the 1990s, and drug abuse becomes a problem also for country of origin
and of transit. The huge differential in profits that becomes possible whenever a
good is illicit (hence, not subject to taxation) and borders are shuffling and
permeable, makes criminal enterprises emerge. The current prohibitionist and
sanctioning structure of international relations, the extraordinary development of
mobility, communication and financial infrastructures, and the constraints on
nationalist elites in terms of resources (i.e., no longer cold war-type external support,
poor and small territories) offers to mafia structures the opportunity to promote types
of business that are extremely lucrative and enabling. Drugs, fuel, migrants, tobacco,
arms and other smuggling activities across several borders become typical tools
by which mafias emancipate themselves from the role of mere provider and
become able to intervene directly in the management of political violence
(Armao, 2000).
A final insight can be drawn with regard to the relationship between politics and
criminal economy: the production and the trafficking of drugs do not develop
unless they benefit from favourable political conditions (Chouvy, 2001).
Transnational crime needs countries where finance and banking are easily
accessible. To fully comprehend the perverse way in which illicit profits are linked
with the perception of stability one can look at the construction sector, which by
the end of the ‘black decade’ became the pulling economic sector across the entire
region.24 In 2006 the governor of the Central Bank of Albania warned about
possible recession in the real estate market. The upward trend in this sector was
maintained by migrant remittances, and profits from illegal activities.
Paradoxically, then, given the dwindling of remittances and the predominance of
the construction sector, stability for Albania would entail that illegal activities are
not disrupted (Lubonja, 2006).
This reconstruction documents the symbiosis between politics and illicit trade and
business, it on the one hand unmasks much of the argument predicated on ethnic
hatreds and grievances, on the other it cannot be reduced to apolitical analytical
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categories such as the greed of elites. By transforming the nature of the criminal
reality and activities, political factors that have to do with state formation and
positioning vis-a`-vis European and global events, dominate the evolution of drug
trafficking in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. The emergence of small, stifled
states keen on dismantling welfare safety nets, devoid of institutional autonomy and
margins of manoeuvre in the international arena, seems to provide an ideal soil for
mafia structures to prosper.
Notes
1 The concept of ‘’deep state’ is illuminated by episodes such as the Susurluk car accident of 1996. On 3
November 1996 a Mercedes collided with a lorry. The car was carrying a top police official, a member
of parliament, a wanted gang leader, and a former beauty queen. The crash pointed to shady links
between politicians, police, the military and criminal gangs.
2 Notorious is the state company Kintex, which covered the activities of the Syrian Ismet Fatik Turkmen
Shaban.
3 ‘Un proiettile al cuore del piu´ ricco di Bulgaria’, Osservatorio Balcani, 11 March 2003. A vittima
eccellente was Filip Pavel Naidenov (alias ‘Fatik Junior’, son of the mentioned Ismet Fatik), a major
dealer in weapons and drugs (‘Sofia come Chicago anni ’20’,Osservatorio Balcani, 20 August 2003).
Another protagonist of smuggling in and through Bulgaria was Konstantin Dimitrov, alias
Samokovetsa; he was in charge of dozens of transport and security companies when he ended his days
face down in a hotel of Amsterdam in December 2003 (Mangalakova, 2003).
4 ‘Crimine e politica in Bulgaria: i musi’, Osservatorio Balcani, 19 March 2003.
5 UN Security Council resolutions 713 and 724, 1991.
6 Turkish Daily News (Ankara, 5 March 1997) reports that the American Drug Enforcement Agency
estimated that every month, four to six tons of heroin left Turkey to be introduced in Europe.
7 T. Sansa in La Stampa, 5 August 1991 (cited in Gambino and Grimaldi, 1995).
8 Assessments by Paul Beaver for Jane’s Defence Weekly (quoted in Bellamy, 1995).
9 Before opting for employing explosives, the Corleonesi of Cosa Nostra had been testing some
bazookas and anti-tank weapons that had been ordered in ex-Yugoslav territories.
10 Family-based enlarged clans along which Albanian mafia organizations tend to be structured.
11 ‘Montenegrin-Albanian flour smuggling’, OMRI Daily Digest, 18 October 1995.
12 Globus, 8 July 1994 – quoting the Albanian newspaper Gazeta Alleanca (cited in Ameye, 2006).
13 See also Commissione Parlamentare di Inchiesta sul Fenomeno della Mafia, ‘Audition of the Ministry
of Interior’, Rome, 18 April 1997.
14 Agence France-Presse, 9 June 1998.
15 G. Barbacetto, in La Repubblica, 10 February 2001.
16 Figures provided by the Albanian Ministry of Interior give a rough estimate of 600 zodiac speedboats
active during the decade 1992–2002.
17 ‘Novom HDZ-u moze se povjerovati tek kada vrati opljackani golemi novac iz domovine i
inozemstva!’, Novi List, 30 March 2004.
18 See also Nacional, 9 November 2001.
19 In 1992 the Jadran Express, a ship carrying the Maltese flag was intercepted in the Adriatic Sea with a
load of 20 tons of artillery ammunition heading to Montenegro and Serbia. The societies that cover the
load refer to Italian organized crime and are based in Cyprus, Gibraltar and Croatia.
20 The transfer of some $300 million to Belgrade, which was announced in December 1999 after a visit to
China by the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs (Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 2000), could
in large part be regarded as Yugoslav capital on its way back.
21 Monti was controlled by the powerful Italian mafia boss Francesco Prudentino, eventually arrested in
Thessaloniki, Greece in December 2000.
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22 On Operation Crna Gora, see the report ‘Tobacco Companies Linked to Criminal Organizations in
Cigarette Smuggling’, Center for Public Integrity – International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists, 3 March 2001.
23 5,690 tons of illegally traded cigarettes were seized in 1999 inside the EU borders. EU experts are
convinced that this figure represents approximately 10 per cent of the cigarettes actually smuggled
(Sensini, 2001).
24 The Balkan construction sector gained world-wide reach. Kosovar Albanian Behgjet Pac¸olli is in
control of a veritable empire (Mabetex) headquartered in Switzerland, with interests in South America,
the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union (construction of the new Kazakhi capital)
and above all Russia (reconstruction of the parliament building, bombarded in 1993). In Russia, the
detonation of the ‘affaire Mabetex’ touched President Yeltsin, involving the then Swiss prosecutor
Carla del Ponte and the Security Services then led by Vladimir Putin.
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